{"id":2143,"date":"2025-12-19T17:44:44","date_gmt":"2025-12-19T17:44:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.eu.enginyr.ing\/?p=2143"},"modified":"2025-12-19T17:44:45","modified_gmt":"2025-12-19T17:44:45","slug":"cve-2025-11234-qemu-kvm-vnc-websocket-use-after-free-enables-pre-authentication-dos","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/en\/blog\/cve-2025-11234-qemu-kvm-vnc-websocket-use-after-free-enables-pre-authentication-dos\/","title":{"rendered":"CVE-2025-11234: QEMU-KVM VNC WebSocket Use-After-Free Enables Pre-Authentication DoS"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the landscape of virtualization security, few things keep sysadmins awake at night quite like a pre-authentication vulnerability in the hypervisor stack. CVE-2025-11234 is exactly that nightmare scenario. It is a critical use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability discovered in the QEMU VNC WebSocket implementation that places virtualization infrastructure\u2014from small private clouds to massive multi-tenant platforms\u2014at immediate risk. This vulnerability allows attackers with simple network access to the VNC port to trigger a denial of service (DoS) during the handshake phase, effectively crashing the QEMU process before any authentication credentials are even exchanged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The flaw impacts the <code>QIOChannelWebsock<\/code> object handling in <code>qemu-kvm<\/code> across multiple Linux distributions, including Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL), CentOS, Debian, and Ubuntu. Red Hat has rated this severity as moderate to high, releasing security advisory RHSA-2025:23228. For any team managing virtualized infrastructure, understanding the mechanics of this bug is not an academic exercise\u2014it is an operational necessity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At <a href=\"https:\/\/www.enginyring.com\/en\/virtual-servers\">ENGINYRING<\/a>, we have spent the last week auditing clusters and patching hypervisors against this specific threat. In our experience, vulnerabilities like this are deceptive; they appear to be simple &#8220;crash bugs,&#8221; but the underlying memory corruption mechanics often hide potential for remote code execution (RCE). If your VNC ports are exposed to the internet or accessible from untrusted internal VLANs, your infrastructure is currently running on borrowed time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Anatomy of a Use-After-Free in Virtualization<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To understand why CVE-2025-11234 is dangerous, we must look under the hood of QEMU&#8217;s event handling. QEMU is an event-driven application. It relies heavily on GLib&#8217;s Main Loop and <code>GSource<\/code> mechanism to handle asynchronous events like network I\/O, timers, and hardware interrupts. When you connect to a VM&#8217;s VNC console via a WebSocket, QEMU doesn&#8217;t just block and wait for you; it registers a &#8220;source&#8221; (a callback function) with the main event loop to listen for data on that socket.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The GSource Race Condition<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The specific vulnerability resides in how QEMU manages the lifecycle of the <code>QIOChannelWebsock<\/code> object. This object represents the WebSocket connection state. In a normal workflow, a client connects, the handshake occurs, and the channel becomes active. However, network programming is rarely &#8220;normal.&#8221; Connections drop, timeouts happen, and packets arrive out of order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The flaw occurs when the <code>QIOChannelWebsock<\/code> object is freed\u2014perhaps due to a connection error or timeout\u2014while it is still technically &#8220;waiting&#8221; for the handshake to complete. Crucially, the code fails to properly deregister the associated <code>GSource<\/code> from the main event loop before freeing the memory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here is the sequence of the failure:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Connection Init:<\/strong> A client initiates a VNC WebSocket connection. QEMU allocates a <code>QIOChannelWebsock<\/code> object.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Source Registration:<\/strong> QEMU attaches a <code>GSource<\/code> to the event loop to watch for the WebSocket handshake completion.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Premature Cleanup:<\/strong> The attacker triggers a condition (such as a rapid disconnect or malformed frame) that causes QEMU to free the <code>QIOChannelWebsock<\/code> object.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The Dangling Reference:<\/strong> The <code>GSource<\/code> remains active in the event loop, pointing to the memory address where the object <em>used<\/em> to be.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The Crash:<\/strong> The event loop fires the callback. The callback tries to read from the freed memory address (Use-After-Free). The process crashes immediately due to a segmentation fault or memory corruption.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In a managed environment like our <a href=\"https:\/\/www.enginyring.com\/en\/proxmox-management\">Proxmox Management<\/a> service, we monitor for these specific segmentation faults in the hypervisor logs, as they are often the first indicator of a probe or attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Why &#8220;Pre-Authentication&#8221; Changes the Threat Model<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The most critical aspect of CVE-2025-11234 is the phrase &#8220;pre-authentication.&#8221; In the hierarchy of vulnerabilities, these are the most severe because they remove the barrier to entry. An attacker does not need to compromise a user account, steal an SSH key, or guess a VNC password. They simply need TCP connectivity to the target port.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This significantly expands the attack surface in three distinct scenarios:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">1. The Public Cloud Console Exposure<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Many hosting providers and private cloud setups offer &#8220;VNC Console&#8221; access to clients. Often, this is proxied, but in some legacy or misconfigured setups, the VNC WebSocket port (starting at 5700) is exposed directly to the internet to allow noVNC clients to connect. If your infrastructure fits this description, every single VM is a target. An attacker can scan for open 5700-5799 ports and systematically crash the QEMU processes, causing a mass outage of customer instances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">2. The &#8220;Trusted&#8221; Internal Network<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We often see internal networks treated as &#8220;safe zones&#8221; where firewall rules are relaxed. &#8220;It&#8217;s behind the VPN, so it&#8217;s fine,&#8221; is a common sentiment. However, if a threat actor gains a foothold on a single workstation or a compromised container within that network, they can leverage CVE-2025-11234 to bring down critical virtualization hosts. Internal attackers are particularly dangerous because they often have mapped out the infrastructure and know exactly which hosts run mission-critical databases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">3. Shared Hosting and Multi-Tenancy<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In multi-tenant environments, one malicious tenant could potentially disrupt neighbors. If the network segmentation between the guest VMs and the hypervisor management interface is not strictly enforced (a common issue in &#8220;flat&#8221; network designs), a compromised VM could attack the VNC ports of adjacent VMs on the same host or cluster.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Impact Assessment: Denial of Service and Beyond<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While the primary and most immediate impact is Denial of Service (DoS), sysadmins should not be complacent. A QEMU crash is disruptive\u2014it forces a hard reboot of the VM, potentially corrupting databases or filesystems that were not properly flushed to disk. For a high-availability cluster, a simultaneous crash of multiple QEMU processes can destabilize the entire node, triggering fencing agents and chaotic failover loops.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, the long-term concern with Use-After-Free bugs is always <strong>Remote Code Execution (RCE)<\/strong>. While difficult, it is theoretically possible for a sophisticated attacker to manipulate the memory heap (Heap Feng Shui) so that the freed memory region is reallocated to a new object controlled by the attacker. When the dangling <code>GSource<\/code> callback executes, it might read data from this &#8220;fake&#8221; object, potentially redirecting code execution flow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Historically, escaping the virtual machine (VM Escape) is the holy grail of hypervisor exploitation. While CVE-2025-11234 originates from the network side (the management interface) rather than from within the guest, an RCE exploit here would grant the attacker execution privileges of the QEMU process on the host system. Depending on your <a href=\"https:\/\/www.enginyring.com\/en\/blog\/how-to-secure-a-vanilla-vps-a-comprehensive-guide-for-linux-beginners\">VPS security configuration<\/a>, this could run as root or a dedicated <code>qemu<\/code> user with significant capabilities (like accessing block devices or network interfaces).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Identifying Vulnerable Systems<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Before you can fix the problem, you must quantify it. The vulnerability exists in the upstream QEMU codebase, meaning it affects virtually every distribution that hasn&#8217;t backported the specific patch for <code>io\/channel-websock.c<\/code>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Version Checking<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">You need to audit your hypervisor hosts, not the guest VMs. Run the following commands to check your installed versions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Red Hat \/ CentOS \/ AlmaLinux:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-code\"><code>rpm -qa | grep qemu-kvm<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Look for versions prior to <code>qemu-kvm-8.2.0-11.el9_4.18<\/code> on RHEL 9 systems. Earlier distributions (CentOS 7\/8) will have different version strings but require equivalent backported patches.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Debian \/ Ubuntu:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-code\"><code>dpkg -l | grep qemu-system<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On Debian, check the security tracker for your specific release (Bullseye, Bookworm, Trixie). Ubuntu LTS releases (20.04, 22.04, 24.04) typically push these updates via the <code>-security<\/code> pocket.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Auditing Active Listeners<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Just having the package installed doesn&#8217;t mean you are exposed. You are only vulnerable if VNC WebSockets are active. Use <code>ss<\/code> (Socket Statistics) to find listening processes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-code\"><code>sudo ss -lntp | grep qemu<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Standard VNC traffic usually listens on 5900+ (TCP). <strong>WebSocket<\/strong> traffic usually listens on 5700+ (TCP). If you see lines like <code>0.0.0.0:5700<\/code>, your host is listening on all interfaces, and you are critically exposed. If you see <code>127.0.0.1:5700<\/code>, you are only listening locally (safer, but still vulnerable to local attackers or proxy bypasses).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Remediation and Mitigation Strategies<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Fixing hypervisor vulnerabilities is operationally heavy. Unlike updating a web application, you cannot just &#8220;reload&#8221; QEMU without killing the VM it supports. Remediation requires a strategy that balances security urgency with uptime requirements. We recommend the following tiered approach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Strategy A: The Full Patch (Recommended)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The only way to eliminate the bug is to replace the binary. This requires a restart of every QEMU process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Update the Host:<\/strong> Run <code>yum update qemu-kvm<\/code> or <code>apt install --only-upgrade qemu-system-x86<\/code>. Verify the new version is installed.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Drain the Node (Live Migration):<\/strong> If you are running a cluster (like Proxmox or OpenStack), live migrate your running VMs to an already-patched host. This preserves uptime for the workloads.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Reboot\/Restart:<\/strong> If you cannot migrate, you must shut down the VMs and start them again. A simple reboot inside the guest OS is <strong>not sufficient<\/strong>; that only restarts the guest kernel, not the QEMU process on the host. You must fully stop and start the VM instance.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For details on managing updates safely, refer to our guide on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.enginyring.com\/en\/blog\/server-update-vs-upgrade-whats-the-difference-and-why-it-matters\">Server Update vs Upgrade<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Strategy B: Disable WebSocket Support (Configuration)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If you cannot patch immediately, you can mitigate the vulnerability by disabling the WebSocket functionality. Most environments use standard VNC (port 59xx) for administration and only enable WebSockets (port 57xx) for browser-based clients like noVNC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In <code>\/etc\/libvirt\/qemu.conf<\/code>, look for VNC configuration. Ensure that WebSocket listeners are disabled or not defined. If you are using QEMU command lines directly, remove the <code>websocket=on<\/code> parameter from your <code>-vnc<\/code> argument.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Strategy C: Network Segmentation (Firewalling)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If you absolutely must keep WebSockets running for a specific application, you must isolate the traffic. Do not allow the entire internet to reach port 5700. Use <code>nftables<\/code> or <code>iptables<\/code> to whitelist only your management bastion or VPN gateway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-code\"><code># Example nftables rule to allow VNC WebSockets only from 10.10.50.5 (Bastion)\nadd rule ip filter input tcp dport 5700-5799 saddr 10.10.50.5 accept\nadd rule ip filter input tcp dport 5700-5799 drop<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This does not fix the bug\u2014the code is still vulnerable\u2014but it drastically reduces the attack surface to only trusted machines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Strategy D: Reverse Proxy Encapsulation (The Pro Move)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In our managed infrastructure, we rarely expose QEMU ports directly. Instead, we recommend placing a reverse proxy like Nginx or HAProxy in front of the VNC WebSocket. This provides two massive benefits: it breaks the direct TCP connection (potentially shielding QEMU from malformed packets) and adds an authentication layer (SSL\/TLS + Basic Auth) <em>before<\/em> the traffic ever reaches QEMU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here is a robust Nginx configuration to wrap a vulnerable VNC WebSocket:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-code\"><code>server {\n    listen 443 ssl;\n    server_name vnc.yourdomain.com;\n\n    # SSL Certs\n    ssl_certificate \/etc\/nginx\/ssl\/fullchain.pem;\n    ssl_certificate_key \/etc\/nginx\/ssl\/privkey.pem;\n\n    location \/websockify {\n        # Proxy to local QEMU WebSocket (bind QEMU to 127.0.0.1 only!)\n        proxy_pass http:\/\/127.0.0.1:5700;\n        \n        # WebSocket Support\n        proxy_http_version 1.1;\n        proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;\n        proxy_set_header Connection \"upgrade\";\n        \n        # Security: Only allow authenticated users\n        auth_basic \"Restricted VNC Access\";\n        auth_basic_user_file \/etc\/nginx\/.htpasswd;\n    }\n}<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By using this method, an attacker attempting to exploit CVE-2025-11234 would first need to bypass Nginx&#8217;s authentication. Since the exploit is pre-authentication at the VNC layer, adding HTTP Basic Auth effectively neutralizes the &#8220;unauthenticated&#8221; aspect of the threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Detecting Active Exploitation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">How do you know if someone is already trying to crash your servers? You need to look at the logs. A successful DoS attack via this vulnerability will result in the QEMU process terminating unexpectedly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Check the system journal for segmentation faults related to <code>qemu-kvm<\/code>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-code\"><code>journalctl -xe | grep \"segfault\" | grep \"qemu\"<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">You may see entries similar to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\"><p>kernel: qemu-kvm[12345]: segfault at 0000000000000010 ip 00007f&#8230; sp 00007f&#8230; error 4 in qemu-kvm<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Additionally, check your libvirt logs located in <code>\/var\/log\/libvirt\/qemu\/<\/code>. If you see repeated connection initializations followed immediately by &#8220;connection closed&#8221; or process termination without a clean shutdown signal, investigate the source IP addresses of those connections immediately. For a broader guide on security monitoring, refer to our article on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.enginyring.com\/en\/blog\/how-to-detect-intruders-in-your-vps-server-complete-security-guide\">detecting intruders in your VPS<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Operational Cost of Unmanaged Virtualization<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-11234 highlight the hidden costs of managing your own virtualization stack. It isn&#8217;t just about spinning up VMs; it&#8217;s about tracking upstream CVEs, understanding the nuance between a &#8220;moderate&#8221; and &#8220;critical&#8221; rating, and having the engineering confidence to perform live migrations or complex patching workflows at 3 AM.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For businesses that need the power of KVM without the sysadmin headache, we offer fully managed solutions. Whether you need isolated <a href=\"https:\/\/www.enginyring.com\/en\/virtual-servers\">Virtual Servers<\/a> or a dedicated <a href=\"https:\/\/www.enginyring.com\/en\/proxmox-management\">Proxmox Management<\/a> contract, ENGINYRING ensures that the underlying hypervisor is patched, hardened, and monitored. We handle the <code>GSource<\/code> leaks and memory corruption bugs so you can focus on your applications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Furthermore, having a robust backup strategy is the final safety net against any DoS or corruption event. Ensure you are following <a href=\"https:\/\/www.enginyring.com\/en\/blog\/automated-backup-strategies-for-vps-rsync-restic-and-off-site-storage\">automated backup best practices<\/a> to guarantee that even if a hypervisor crashes, your data remains safe and recoverable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Summary of Action Items<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Audit:<\/strong> Identify all systems running <code>qemu-kvm<\/code> and check for listening ports on 57xx.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Patch:<\/strong> Schedule maintenance windows to update QEMU to version 8.2.0-11.el9_4.18 (RHEL) or equivalent.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Reboot:<\/strong> Remember that updating the package is not enough; the process must restart.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Isolate:<\/strong> If patching is delayed, firewall the VNC ports or wrap them in an Nginx reverse proxy with authentication.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Monitor:<\/strong> Set up alerts for QEMU segmentation faults in your centralized logging system.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the landscape of virtualization security, few things keep sysadmins awake at night quite like a pre-authentication vulnerability in the hypervisor stack. CVE-2025-11234 is exactly that nightmare scenario. It is a critical use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability discovered in the QEMU VNC WebSocket implementation that places virtualization infrastructure\u2014from small private clouds to massive multi-tenant platforms\u2014at immediate risk. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":2144,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[12],"tags":[13061,13075,13069,13077,13065,13070,13074,13068,13071,13063,13078,13073,13060,13064,13067,13072,13079,13066,13076,13062],"class_list":["post-2143","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-virtual-servers","tag-cve-2025-11234","tag-cve-2025-11234-detection","tag-enterprise-linux-security-updates","tag-gsource-event-loop-bug","tag-hypervisor-security-patching","tag-kvm-mitigation-strategies","tag-libvirt-security-hardening","tag-linux-virtualization-security","tag-nginx-vnc-proxy","tag-pre-authentication-denial-of-service","tag-qemu-memory-corruption","tag-qemu-kvm-crash-analysis","tag-qemu-kvm-use-after-free","tag-qiochannelwebsock-exploit","tag-rhsa-202523228","tag-secure-vnc-configuration","tag-sysadmin-security-guide","tag-virtualization-infrastructure-security","tag-virtualization-live-migration","tag-vnc-websocket-vulnerability"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2143","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2143"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2143\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2145,"href":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2143\/revisions\/2145"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/2144"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2143"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2143"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.serverspan.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2143"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}